Riccardo Brighenti: Names and Quotation in Aristotelian Commentators
My talk addresses a claim made by Porphyry and attributed to Boethus of Sidon by Simplicius that, for any linguistic expression x, x qualifies as a name if x is taken up under a quotation device ‘…’ ('x') in metalanguage statements (‘x’ is a letter). I reconstruct how this claim can be assessed philosophically by articulating three non-equivalent options. The three options I examine are borrowed from cases in the history of philosophy I take to be isomorphic and construct analogously. (1) ‘x’ is a name because it is the proper name of the expression x and ‘x’ is a name distinct from x (Carnap et al.). (2) x is a name because x can signify the expression x and the addition of ‘…’ serves to disambiguate when it does so (Paul of Venice et al.). (3) ‘x’ abbreviates a fuller NP such as “the such-and-such item x” and it exhibits sufficient morphosyntactic features of names to count as one (Apollonius Dyscolus et al.). I argue that, while an interpretation along the lines of (2) is promising and compatible with the broader commitments of Boethius, Porphyry, and Simplicius as Aristotelian commentators, the evidence at issue tends rather to support a reading closer to (3).
Elisa Diambri: The Metaphysics of Habit in Abelard's Dialectica
In this paper, I investigate Peter Abelard’s theory of habit (habitus) as developed in his Dialectica, focusing on the fifth section of De qualitate in Book III (De reliquis predicamentis, 93–103, ed. De Rijk 1970). Although Abelard lacked access to Aristotle’s treatments of habit in the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics, I argue that his commentary on the Categories offers a systematic and philosophically rich account of habit that has been largely neglected in current scholarship. By concentrating on the interconnected treatments of habit and disposition, passible quality or passion, and natural potency and impotency, I reconstruct Abelard’s theory of habit as part of a broader metaphysical constellation of qualities. I show that habit, like disposition, cannot be understood in isolation, but emerges at the intersection of permanence and removability, potency and impotency, and natural aptitudes and temporality. In particular, I argue that Abelard’s analysis of potentia and inpotentia plays a crucial role in clarifying the ontological status of habit and dispositions and their modal implications. Finally, I suggest that Abelard’s account of habit is deeply intertwined with his various conceptions of nature (natura, natura rei, natura rerum, as well as substantia or constitutio), and that this nexus contributes to the formation of his nominalist metaphysics. By foregrounding Abelard’s original engagement with Aristotelian and Boethian sources, this paper aims to reposition his theory of habit as a central and philosophically significant component of his metaphysics
Shixiang Jin & Nicola Polloni: Neo-Confucian Ontology and Scholastic Reconfigurations
This chapter reconstructs two competing ontological models within Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, one associated with Zhang Zai and the other with Zhu Xi, both articulated through the qi (氣)–li (理) framework. It argues that the disagreement between Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi concerns the explanatory salience rather than the ontological status of qi and li as such: Zhang Zai grounds order in the intrinsic activity of qi, whereas Zhu Xi assigns explanatory primacy to li while maintaining its inseparability from qi. Further this chapter examines how these models impacted on the thought of Niccolò Longobardo, in his scholastic engagement with Neo-Confucian thought. It shows that Longobardo attempts to refute Neo-Confucian ontology by recoding qi and li within a hylomorphic framework, thereby changing their explanatory roles. This strategy fails, however, because the resulting reconstruction does not sustain a coherent refutation even on its own metaphysical terms. This is a study case that illustrates both the risks inherent in conceptual recoding across traditions and the philosophical importance of cross-traditional comparison when pursued with conceptual discipline.
John Marenbon: Idealism and Doing without Matter. Gregory of Nyssa, John Scottus Eriugena and George Berkeley
In a famous article from the early 1980s, Myles Burnyeat argued that Idealism (of which he took Berkley's thought to be a prime example) was one of the few philosophical positions that was not first proposed by the Greeks: indeed, he said, it was impossible before Descartes. His thesis was quickly challenged by Richard Sorabji, who brought up the fourth-century Greek philosopher and theologian Gregory of Nyssa as a counter-example. In a few places Gregory argues that bodies can be considered as combinations of characteristics, such as extension, colour, hotness or coldness, which are themselves incorporeal. There is no role for matter. Does this not qualify him as, contra Burnyeat, an ancient idealist? I shall argue that, as most but not all specialists hold, Gregory's position is far from seeing things in the world as ideas in minds, as Berkley did. I shall then discuss John Scottus Eriugena’s discussion of matter in his masterpiece, the Periphyseon (860s). Eriugena quotes Gregory's discussion of matter and professes to be following him, but he radically changes his theory and ends by reintroducing the notion of formless matter and giving it a close relation to God. Looking at Gregory of Nyssa and Eriugena, it seems that Burnyeat was right. Neither was remotely like Berkley. But, in fact, Burnyeat's article is mistaken. It is based on an indefensible view of Descartes's originality (the result of simply leaving the Middle Ages out of the history of philosophy), and a failure to see the unusual nature of Berkeley's idealism in his famous works, or to recognize Berkeley's change of mind in his late and unjustly neglected Siris. 'Idealism' in a useful sense has deep ancient roots, but it is linked only loosely, and in a variety of different ways, to doing without matter.